Nanomaterials or nanoparticles? Challenges of the nano domain ontology

Abstract

The aim of this article is to formulate some philosophical problems resulting from the analysis of the field of nanosciences, taking certain discussions coming from the philosophy of chemistry as the departing point. Many problems, usually approached to in their epistemological dimension in the philosophy of science, are endowed with a relevant ontological dimension that should not be disregarded. On the basis of this belief, we are particularly interested in the problems related to the ontology of nanosciences, specifically: Of what kind of entities is the nanoworld populated? Which is the nature of those entities? How can this domain be characterized and understood? With this purpose, we will analyze how nanomaterials or nanoparticles can be characterized and what place these entities occupy in the chemical world. In particular, we will argue that, in the level of nano–chemistry, the ontological categories of individual and stuff are not adequate, and a new category is required, whose intermediate nature is manifested in language: we use the term ‘nanoparticles’ when we think in individuals, whereas we talk of ‘nanomaterials’ when we think in stuff.